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Abstract 
 A training workshop utilising the most up to date research in cognitive lie detection 
was designed and evaluated. For this evaluation, 27 experienced police detectives each 
interviewed one mock-suspect (a truth teller or liar) before training and another mock-suspect 
(a truth teller or liar) after training. Different mock-crimes were used in the pre- and post 
training interviews. The police detectives were free to interview the mock-suspect in any way 
they felt appropriate but were asked to try to incorporate (some of) the taught techniques in 
the post-training interviews. The detectives made veracity judgements and the interviews 
were transcribed and coded for the amount of detail elicited and the questions asked. 
Trainees’ ability to distinguish truth tellers from liars improved, and so did the percentage of 
appropriate questions they asked. Trainees did not implement the taught techniques to an 
equal extent, but when they were used, the techniques enhanced the elicitation of information 
and discrimination between truth tellers and liars. The training study also revealed challenges, 
particularly difficulty in implementing the taught techniques into practice (detectives often 
thought they had used techniques taught in the training when they in fact not used them as 
they had been shown to do) and asking the right questions to elicit differences in detail 
between truth tellers and liars.   
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Translating theory into practice:  
Evaluating a cognitive lie detection training workshop  
DePaulo and her colleagues conclusively demonstrated that cues to deceit are 
typically faint and unreliable (DePaulo et al., 2003; DePaulo & Morris, 2004). Based on this 
meta-analysis several researchers examined whether investigators can elicit new or enhance 
existing cues to deceit through specific interview protocols (Vrij & Granhag, 2012). The two 
most extensively examined approaches to date are the Strategic Use of Evidence technique 
and the cognitive lie detection approach (see Granhag and Hartwig [2015], Hartwig, Granhag, 
and Luke [2014] and Vrij [2015] for overviews of this research). 
 We developed a cognitive lie detection training workshop which takes into account 
the results of more than 20 studies into the cognitive lie detection approach (Vrij, 2015). In 
this article we discuss the results of a study whereby we evaluated the workshop, but 
commence with a synopsis of the theoretical background of the cognitive lie detection 
approach. 
The Cognitive Lie Detection Approach 
The core of the cognitive lie detection approach is that investigators can magnify the 
differences in cognitive cues displayed by truth tellers and liars through interventions based 
on cognitive principles that make the liars’ task more cognitively demanding. If successful, 
those interventions should result in liars displaying more diagnostic cognitive cues to 
deception (e.g., lack of detail or plausibility) and thereby facilitating lie detection. The 
cognitive lie detection approach comprises three components: (i) imposing cognitive load; (ii) 
encouraging interviewees to say more, and (iii) asking unexpected questions. 
Imposing cognitive load is based on the well established empirical finding that in 
interview settings lying is typically more mentally taxing than truth telling (see for example 
fMRI research, Christ et al. 2009; Vrij & Ganis, 2014). Imposing cognitive load refers to 
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investigators’ interventions aimed at making the interview setting mentally even more 
difficult. Liars, who require more cognitive resources than truth tellers, will have fewer 
cognitive resources left over. If cognitive demand is further raised, which could be achieved 
by making additional requests, liars may be less able than truth tellers to cope with these 
additional requests (Vrij, Granhag, Mann, & Leal, 2011). Ways to impose cognitive load 
discussed in the training are asking interviewees to tell their stories in reverse order (e.g., 
Evans, Meissner, Michael, & Brandon, 2013; Vrij et al., 2008), ‘forced turn-taking’, which is 
suitable when more than one person is interviewed at the same time (groups of liars and 
groups of truth tellers) (Vernham, Vrij, Mann, Leal, & Hillman, 2014), and engaging 
interviewees in a second task (e.g., watching a video of an unrelated event) while conducting 
the interview (Debey, Verschuere, & Crombez, 2012; Visu-Petra, Varga, Miclea, & Visu-Petra, 
2013). 
The second cluster of techniques is meant to encourage interviewees to provide more 
information. It will help truth tellers if they provide much information, because the richer an 
account is perceived to be in detail, the more likely it is to be believed (Bell & Loftus, 1989; 
Johnson, 2006). Moreover, the additional information truth tellers provide could give leads to 
investigators to check. Liars may find it cognitively too difficult to add as many details as 
truth tellers do. Alternatively, if liars do add substantial detail, the additional information may 
sound less plausible. In addition, liars may be reluctant to add more information out of fear 
that it will provide leads to investigators and, consequently, give their lies away. Hence, we 
expected that techniques to encourage interviewees to say more lead to truth tellers adding 
more (plausible) detail than liars. Empirical research has supported this premethods to 
encourage interviewees to say more discussed in the training include the use of (i) an 
example of a detailed statement (Leal, Vrij, Warmelink, & Fisher, 2015), see also the ‘social 
proof’ literature (Bond & Smith, 1996; Cialdini, 1993), (ii) a supportive interviewer (e.g., 
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Mann et al., 2012), (iii) deliberate mimicry of the interviewee (Shaw, Vrij, Mann, Leal, 
Fisher, & Granhag, 2015) and (iv) drawings (e.g., Roos af Hjelmsäter, Öhman, Granhag, & 
Vrij, 2014).  
The third cluster of techniques relates to asking unexpected questions. A consistent 
finding in the deception literature is that liars prepare themselves for anticipated interviews, 
and see Tedeschini (2012) for a description of a real-world case. They do so by preparing 
possible answers to questions they expect to be asked (e.g., Hartwig, Granhag, & Strömwall, 
2007). This strategy of preparing answers for possible questions makes sense. Planning makes 
lying easier -thereby combating, to some degree, the additional cognitive demand of lying- and 
so planned lies typically contain fewer cues to deceit than spontaneous lies (DePaulo et al., 
2003).  
Preparing for answers has a limitation. It will be fruitful only if liars correctly anticipate 
which questions will be asked. Investigators can exploit this limitation by asking questions 
that liars do not anticipate. Though liars can refuse to answer unexpected questions by saying 
“I don’t know” or “I can’t remember”, such responses will create suspicion if they are about 
central aspects of the target event. A liar, therefore, has little option other than to fabricate a 
plausible answer on the spot, which is cognitively demanding. For liars, expected questions 
should be easier to answer than unexpected questions, because liars can give their planned and 
rehearsed answers to the expected questions but they need to fabricate answers to the 
unexpected questions. The difference liars experience in cognitive load while answering these 
two sets of questions should become evident in their verbal responses. In contrast, truth tellers 
experience similar levels of cognitive load while answering expected and unexpected questions, 
and they should produce more comparable answers to the expected and unexpected questions 
than liars. Research supports the unexpected questions approach, and examples of unexpected 
questions include spatial questions (Vrij et al., 2009), questions about processes (e.g., planning 
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of a trip) rather than outcomes (e.g., purpose of a trip) (Mac Giolla, Granhag, & Liu-Jönsson, 
2013), and asking the same question twice in different formats (Leins, Fisher, & Vrij, 2012; 
Leins, Fisher, Vrij, Leal, & Mann, 2011).   
Training Performance Indicators  
To evaluate the training we examined three performance indicators: (i) Accuracy in 
discriminating truth tellers from liars, (ii) the total amount of detail provided by the mock-
suspects, and (iii) the types of questions the trainees (police detectives) asked the mock-
suspects. In lie detection studies 50% accuracy can be expected just by flipping a coin 
because the target person is either lying or telling the truth. Bond and DePaulo’s meta-
analysis revealed an average accuracy rate of 54% in correctly classifying truth tellers and 
liars, which is only just above the level of chance. Vrij (2008) examined the accuracy rates 
obtained by professionals (e.g., police officers, police detectives, customs officers, secret 
service agents) in lie detection studies. The average accuracy rate across 30 samples was 56% 
for detecting truths and 56% for detecting lies (56% total accuracy). Although in 29 of those 
studies observers passively watched video fragments of truth tellers and liars rather than 
actively interviewed them, Hartwig, Granhag, Strömwall, and Kronkvist (2006) found a 57% 
total accuracy rate when police detectives actually interviewed mock suspects.  
Deception research has shown that truth tellers typically give more detail than liars 
(DePaulo et al., 2003; Masip, Sporer, Garrido, & Herrero, 2005; Vrij, 2008). Liars may lack 
the imagination to conjure up details that sound plausible (Köhnken, 1996, 2004; Leal, Vrij, 
Warmelink, Vernham, & Fisher, 2015). Liars may also be reluctant to give detail as they run 
the risk that such detail can be proven false by an investigator  (Hartwig, Granhag, & 
Strömwall, 2007; Nahari, Vrij, & Fisher, 2012, 2014) and liars may want to limit the amount 
of false information they provide so that they have less false information to remember and 
report in case they are interviewed again (Vrij, 2008). Since the techniques taught in the 
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training are more difficult to cope with for liars than truth tellers, we predicted that truth 
tellers would be more detailed than liars, particularly after training (Hypothesis 1). 
Oxburgh, Ost and Cherryman (2012) evaluated 26 police interviews with suspected 
child offenders in England and Wales. They found that open-ended, probing and 
encourage/acknowledge questions (so called appropriate questions) related to obtaining more 
information. This supports previous research that has shown that open-ended questions and 
probing questions are the most productive in terms of eliciting information (Fisher, Falkner, 
Trevisan & McCauley, 2000; Griffiths & Milne, 2006; Sternberg, Lamb, Orbarch, Esplin, 
Mitchell, 2001). They are productive because they elicit free recall (Snook et al., 2012), 
because interviewees are allowed to collect their thoughts in their own way, instead of being 
distracted by the interviewer asking other directed questions (Powell, Fisher, & Wright, 
2005) and because they give interviewees time to think, which will lead to more elaborate 
retrieval of memory (Powell et al., 2005). Oxburgh et al. (2012) also found that closed, 
leading, multiple at once, forced choice, echo and opinion/statement questions (so called 
inappropriate questions) resulted in less information being obtained. This, again, supports 
previous research that closed questions lead to less information (Myklebust & Bjorklund, 
2006). Leading questions are also considered inappropriate to use during investigative 
interviewing mostly because they are suggestive (Griffiths & Milne, 2006), and the often 
misleading information embedded in these questions can be incorporated into a person’s 
memory and could eventually lead to false recall in later stages of the interview process 
(Gudjonsson & Clark, 1986). 
 Oxburgh et al. (2012) found that only 29% of the questions asked were appropriate 
questions. Indeed, asking open-ended questions is not common in investigative interviewing, 
and, instead, police officers tend to use closed, forced choice, multiple at once and other 
inappropriate questions (e.g., Bull & Soukara, 2010; Smith, Powell & Lum, 2009; Snook & 
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Keating, 2011). Based on Oxburgh et al.’s findings in England and Wales we expected that 
around 29% of questions asked would be appropriate. The techniques employed in the 
cognitive lie detection approach consist solely of appropriate questions (mainly open-ended 
questions) and, as such, we expected that the detectives would use more appropriate 
questions after training than before, and, in particular, more open-ended questions 
(Hypothesis 2). Four of the taught techniques can easily be detected by reading the 
transcripts: (i) model statement, (ii) reverse order, (iii) drawings and (iv) spatial questions.1 
We examined whether using these four techniques in the interviews would be related to 
accuracy in distinguishing between truth tellers and liars. Since these techniques have been 
shown to elicit differences between truth tellers and liars we expected that this would be the 
case and therefore expected a positive correlation between using the taught techniques and 
accuracy in distinguishing between truth tellers and liars (Hypothesis 3).  
Method 
Participants 
  Interviewers. A total of 27 police detectives (15 men) attended the training and took 
part in the interview study. Ages ranged from 27 to 58 years with an average age of M = 
44.30 (SD = 7.28). Their length of service ranged from 7 to 30 years with an average length 
of M = 18.81 (SD = 5.89). In England and Wales, there are five tiers of interview training for 
officers (tier 5 is the highest level of training). Most detectives (n = 16) were tier-3 trained for 
interviewing suspects, four interviewers were tier-2 trained, one officer was tier-4 trained and 
four officers were tier-5 trained (the remaining two officers did not indicate their training 
level). This level of training had no effect on the accuracy rates reported in the Results 
section or on the type of questions asked. Twenty-two detectives judged themselves as 
experienced in interviewing suspects (score of 4 or higher on a 5 point Likert scale).  
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  Most detectives (n = 14) were tier-2 trained for interviewing witnesses, six 
interviewers were tier-3 trained, and four officers were tier-5 trained (the remaining three 
officers did not indicate their training level). Nine detectives judged themselves as 
experienced in interviewing witnesses (score of 4 or higher on a 5 point Likert scale). 
  Interviewees. A total of 54 interviewees (35 women) acted as mock suspects in the 
training study (27 interviewees took part pre-training and 27 interviewees post training). The 
sample was made up of undergraduate students and university staff. Their age ranged from 18 
to 61 years with an average age of M = 31.80 (SD = 13.85). 
The Training Workshop 
Police detectives were recruited through a police detective training coordinator 
associate. The training content was briefly explained in an email that was sent to 
approximately 50 police detectives through this coordinator with the request to email the first 
author directly if interested in attending. The training and study was held over five days and 
on each day between four and six trainees participated. The training was delivered by the first 
three authors of this paper and started at 10am with a one hour discussion of the ‘pitfalls in lie 
detection’ (difficulties and errors made in lie detection) derived from Vrij (2008) and Vrij, 
Granhag and Porter (2010) (see Appendix 1). 
  The pitfalls section was followed by 30 minutes lunch, which was followed by a 4.5 
hour ‘Opportunities in lie detection’ section (the cognitive lie detection approach), which 
included the introduction of ten techniques as well as demonstrations, videos and exercises. 
Table 1 provides brief descriptions of the ten techniques taught in the training, whereas 
Appendix 1 provides brief descriptions of the demonstrations, videos and exercises.  
Training Evaluation 
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Procedure 
  Interviewers. After arrival at 9am the police detectives were invited to complete a 
brief questionnaire about themselves (age, gender and experience in interviewing). They were 
then asked to interview a mock-suspect in the way they would normally do (or as close as 
they could to normal given the experimental procedure). They were told that they had 30 
minutes maximum for the interview and that the interview would be audiotaped. They were 
given background information about the mock-crime scenario (see Appendix 1). After the 
interview they completed a short questionnaire in which they made a dichotomous veracity 
judgement (What do you think the veracity status of the suspect was? Truth teller or liar) and 
indicated the extent to which they thought the interviewee had told the truth (on a scale 
ranging from 0% to 100%). The training started at 10am. 
  After the training (which finished at 4pm), the detectives were asked to interview 
another mock-suspect. This time they were asked, if possible, to incorporate (some of) the 
techniques taught in the training. They were again given background information about the 
mock-crime scenario (see Appendix 1), which was always another scenario than the pre-
training scenario. After the interview they completed again a short questionnaire, including 
the same two questions as reported above (veracity judgement and telling the truth 
judgement). We also asked the detectives whether they had used the techniques we taught 
them in the training (yes/no). Note that in this study the trainees actively interviewed a mock-
suspect, in contrast to most other training studies where trainees passively watch and assess 
video fragments of truth tellers and liars who were interviewed by someone else (Driskell, 
2012), but see Hartwig et al., (2006) for a training study in which trainees also actively 
interviewed mock-suspects. Four different interview rooms were available for the police 
detectives, which means that four interviews could take place at the same time. The 
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detectives were randomly allocated to the mock-suspects.  
We used two different mock-crime scenarios in the study (the restaurant scenario and 
secret meeting scenario) and each detective was exposed to both scenarios, and the order in 
which this occurred (morning or afternoon) was counterbalanced. Unknown to the detectives, 
they each interviewed one truth teller and one liar. When their interviewee was telling the 
truth or lying (morning or afternoon) was also counterbalanced. At the end of the day, after 
the second interview, the officers were told that they had interviewed one truth teller and one 
liar and received feedback about their veracity judgements. No information was given to the 
police detectives about the base rates, but they were told that we had recruited multiple truth 
tellers and multiple liars for each scenario.   
The restaurant scenario was derived from Strömwall, Granhag, and Jonsson (2003) 
and Vrij et al. (2009) but differed from those studies in that participants stayed in the 
restaurant individually rather than in pairs. The secret meeting scenario was derived from 
Shaw, Vrij, Leal, & Mann (2014) but differed from that study in that the participant saw a 
videotape of the meeting rather than attending the meeting. The secret meeting scenario 
method used is identical to Ewens et al. (2014).  
Interviewees. Participants were recruited by email and online advertisements at the 
university. Interviewees were unaware that the interviewers were taking part in a cognitive lie 
detection training workshop, and they were given no instructions on how to approach the 
interview. On arrival, participants were randomly allocated to the restaurant or secret meeting 
scenario and to the truth or lie condition. The instructions given to the participants in both 
scenarios are described in Appendix 1.  
Both truth tellers and liars were then told that it is important to convince the 
interviewer that they were truthful and that they would receive £10 as a reward if they did so. 
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If the participant did not convince the interviewer s/he would have to write a report about 
his/her whereabouts during the last 15 minutes. The participant was then taken to the 
interview room where the interview took place.  
After the interview, participants completed a post-interview questionnaire, which 
measured motivation, likelihood of receiving £10, likelihood of writing a statement, and how 
difficult they thought the interview was. To measure motivation participants were asked to 
what extent they were motivated to perform well in the interview on a 5 point Likert scale (1 
= not at all motivated to 5 = very motivated). Likelihood of receiving the £10 or writing a 
statement was measured on 7 Likert point scales (1 = not at all to 7 = totally). Cognitive load 
experienced during the interview was measured with three questions: (i) I felt that the 
interview required a lot of thinking, (ii) I felt that the interview was mentally difficult, and 
(iii) I had to concentrate a lot during the interview. Answers were given on 7-point Likert 
scales (1 = disagree to 7 agree). These three questions were clustered into one ‘cognitive 
load’ index (Conbach’s alpha = .78).  
The interviews in both scenarios were audio recorded and subsequently transcribed. 
All interviewers and interviewees signed informed consent forms prior to the study and were 
given a debriefing form after the study. All interviewees were given £10. 
Coding 
All coders were blind to the hypotheses and experimental conditions of the study. 
Total Detail. A coder read the transcripts and coded them for number of details. 
Detail included all the perceptual details (information about what the examinee saw or 
heard); spatial details (information about the spatial arrangement of people and/or objects); 
and temporal details (information about when the event happened or an explicit description of 
a sequence of events). We clustered these different types of detail into one ‘detail’ category 
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as no hypotheses were formulated about the sub-categories. Thus the sentence ‘There was a 
black napkin on the table’ would be coded as four details. A second coder coded a random 
sample of 10 transcripts (19%). Inter-rater reliability between the two coders was excellent 
(ICC = .95). 
Questions asked.  
For coding the questions asked by the detectives in the interviews we used Griffiths 
and Milne’s (2006) categorisation of question types in forensic investigative interviewing: (i) 
open-ended questions (questions mostly beginning with “Tell”, “Describe” or “Explain”), (ii) 
probing questions (questions beginning with one of the five WH words “who”, “where”, 
“when”, “which” or “why” or beginning with “how”), (iii) closed questions (questions that 
can only be answered with “yes” or “no”), (iv) leading questions (where the question 
suggests an answer to the interviewee), (v) forced choice questions, (questions that force the 
interviewee to choose between two or more options), (vi) echo questions (repeating the 
information given by the interviewee but phrased as a question), (vii) encourager or 
acknowledge questions (questions or statements that encourage interviewees to continue 
talking “Mmmm”, “Uh-huh”, “Ah right, thank you”, “Yeah, carry on”), (viii) multiple 
questions at once (multiple questions at the same time without giving the interviewee the 
opportunity to respond between the questions) and (ix) opinion or statement questions 
(expressions of opinions or statements put to the interviewee) (Snook, Luther, Quinlan, & 
Milne, 2012).  
Following Oxburgh et al. (2012), a coder read the transcripts and coded them for the 
questions asked and made a distinction between appropriate questions (open-ended 
questions, probing questions and encourager/acknowledgement questions) and inappropriate 
questions (closed questions, forced choice questions, leading questions, multiple questions at 
once, opinion/statement questions and echo questions). A second coder coded a random 
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sample of 15 transcripts. Inter-rater reliability between the two coders was excellent (ICC = 
.99 for both appropriate and inappropriate questions). 
For four techniques, which can be easily noticed by reading the transcripts ((i) model 
statement, (ii) reverse order, (iii) drawings and (iv) spatial questions), one of the trainers 
coded the number of times the detectives had used each of those techniques in the way we 
taught them to use it. For example, for the use of the model statement the detective first 
needed to elicit a free recall from the participant via an open-ended question (followed by 
further questioning, optional), followed by the model statement and then again an open-ended 
question eliciting a free recall. For the use of drawings, the detective should have asked the 
mock suspect ‘Please sketch everything you could see when…….’ (Vrij, Leal, et al., 2010). A 
second coder coded a random sample of 10 transcripts. Inter-rater reliability between the two 
coders for the cluster of four techniques was excellent (ICC = .90). The number of questions 
based on these four techniques asked in the post-training interviews ranged from 0 to 10 (M = 
3.37, SD = 3.62). 
Interview length. The average length of the interviews was 27 minutes and 43 
seconds (M = 1667.02, SD = 524.64). A 2 (Training) X 2 (Veracity) X 2 (Scenario) ANOVA 
with length of interview as dependent variable revealed a Training, F(1, 46) = 4.80, p = .033, 
d = .61, and Scenario main effect, F(1, 46) = 10.96, p = .002, d = .86. All other effects were 
not significant (all F’s < 2.52, all p’s > .12). The pre-training interviews (M = 30 minutes and 
32 seconds, SD = 404.51, 95% CI [1623.78, 2014.91]) were longer than the post- training 
interviews (M = 25 minutes and 24 seconds, SD = 590.99, 95% CI [1319.14, 1710.27]), and 
the secret meeting interviews (M = 31 minutes and 28 seconds, SD = 495.36, 95% CI 
[1689.32, 2063.71]) were longer than the restaurant interviews (M = 24 minutes and 29 
seconds, SD = 473.87, 95% CI [1270.33, 1644.72]).  
Design 
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 The experiment involves three factors, Training, Veracity and Scenario. Since a 
limited number of police detectives were available to us, a within-subjects design was 
employed. As happens in field studies, we had to adjust the experimental design to the 
knowledge that we had to run the study and carry out the training all in one day. As a result, 
we could not employ a full within-factorial design, in which each detective interviews four 
interviewees (one truth and one lie in each of the two scenarios) pre-training and four 
interviewees post training. In fact, there was only just enough time for each detective to carry 
out one interview pre-training and a second interview post-training. We ran within-subjects 
ANOVAs for Training to test the effect of training on the police questioning, as in these 
analyses Veracity and Scenario are not important factors. Veracity matters when analysing 
accuracy rates and detail and we therefore subsequently carried out between-subjects 
ANOVAs (Training X Veracity X Scenario) to test the effect of training, veracity and 
scenario on accuracy rates and detail. Note that introducing Training as a between-subjects 
factor meant that we had less statistical power for that factor than we would have had if we 
had treated it as a within-subjects factor. 
Results 
Motivation, Likelihood of Receiving an Incentive and Receiving a Penalty, and 
Experienced Cognitive Load 
Four 2 (Training: before or after training) X 2 (Veracity: truth or lie) X 2 (Scenario: 
restaurant or secret meeting) ANOVAs were conducted on the four manipulation checks. The 
analysis for motivation did not reveal any significant effects (all F’s < 2.51, all p’s > .12). 
The average motivation score was very high (M = 6.19, SD =.79 on a 7-point Likert scale). 
The analysis for the likelihood of receiving an incentive revealed a main effect for Veracity, 
F(1, 46) = 7.30, p = .01, d = .76, with truth tellers judging the likelihood as higher (M = 5.30, 
SD = 1.49, 95% CI [4.71, 5.88]) than liars (M = 4.15, SD = 1.54, 95% CI [3.56, 4.73]). All 
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other effects were not significant (all F’s < .85, all p’s > .36). The analysis for the likelihood 
of receiving a penalty did not reveal a significant effect (all F’s < .1.63, all p’s > .20). Finally, 
the analysis about levels of cognitive load experienced resulted in a main effect for Training, 
F(1, 46) = 5.30, p = .026, d = .62, with interviewees who were interviewed after training (M = 
5.32, SD = .92, 95% CI [4.84, 5.80]) experiencing more cognitive load than those who were 
interviewed before training (M 4.57= , SD = .92, 95% CI [4.09, 5.04]).  
Police officers’ accuracy 
 A 2 (Training) X 2 (Veracity) X 2 (Scenario) ANOVA with accuracy in classifying 
truth tellers and liars as dependent variable revealed significant main effects for Training, 
F(1, 46) = 4.06, p = .050, d = .32 and Veracity, F(1, 46) = 58.61, p < .001, d = 2.79 and a 
significant Training X Veracity interaction effect, F(1, 46) = 4.06, p = .05, eta2 = .08. Post-
training total accuracy (M = .74, SD = .45, 95% CI [0.56,0. 92]) was higher than pre-training 
total accuracy (M = .59, SD = .50, 95% CI [0.41, 0.78]); and truth accuracy (M = 1.00, SD = 
0, 95% CI [0.87, 1.13]) was higher than lie accuracy (M = .33, SD = .48, 95% CI [0.20, 
0.47]). Post-training total accuracy (74%) was significantly higher than chance (50%, t(26) = 
2.801, p = .009) and significantly higher than the average accuracy rate obtained by 
professionals in 30 lie detection samples (56%, Vrij, 2008), t(26) = 2.103, p = .045. Pre-
training total accuracy (59%) did not differ from chance (t(26) = .961, p = .345) nor from the 
average accuracy rate obtained by professionals in 30 lie detection samples, (t(26) = .338, p = 
.738). The lie accuracy rate (33%) did not differ significantly from chance (t(26) = 1.803, p = 
.083), but was significantly lower than the average lie accuracy obtained by professionals in 
30 lie detection samples (56%, Vrij, 2008), t(26) = 2.45, p = .021. 
 The significant Training X Veracity interaction effect revealed that truth accuracy was 
the same before (M = 1.00, SD = 0, 95% CI [1.00, 1.00) and after (M = 1.00, SD = 0, 95% CI 
[1.00, 1.00]) training, but that lie accuracy increased from M = .15 (SD = .37, 95% CI [-0.11, 
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0.41]) pre-training to M = .50 (SD = .51, 95% CI [0.25, 0.75]) post-training. The pre-training 
lie accuracy rate (15%) was significantly below chance, t(12) = 3.32, p = .006, and 
significantly below the 56% accuracy rate obtained on average in deception studies with 
professionals t(12) = 3.90, p = .002, whereas the post-training lie accuracy rate (50%) was at 
chance level t(13) = .000, p = 1.00, and did not differ significantly from the 56% accuracy 
rate obtained on average in deception studies with professionals t(13) = .43, p = .67. 
 A 2 (Training) X 2 (Veracity) X 2 (Scenario) ANOVA with the percentage scale (0% 
- 100%) whether the interviewee was telling the truth as dependent variable revealed a 
significant main effect for Veracity, F(1, 46) = 8.95, p = .004, d = .99 and a significant 
Training X Veracity interaction effect, F(1, 46) = 4.12, p = .048. Truth tellers were thought to 
be telling the truth more (M = 82.59, SD = 12.28, 95% CI [76.50, 88.85]) than liars (M = 
66.26, SD = 20.74, 95% CI [63.53, 75.88]). Regarding the interaction effect, simple contrast 
tests revealed that pre-training the interviewers thought that truth tellers (M = 80.00, SD = 
11.77, 95% CI [72.60, 87.40]) and liars (M = 75.38, SD = 15.06, 95% CI [67.70, 83.07]) were 
equally truthful, F(1, 46) = .794, p = .381, d = .34. Post- training, however, truth tellers (M = 
85.38, SD = 12.66, 95% CI [72.93, 97.84]) were seen as more truthful than liars (M = 63.57, 
SD = 24.05, 95% CI [52.87, 74.27]), F(1, 46) = 8.49, p = .007, d = 1.19. 
 This ‘telling the truth’ variable also gives further insight into why the detectives 
obtained 100% accuracy rates in judging truths. Police detectives were lenient towards 
interviewees and made truth judgements even when they thought that the participant had not 
been entirely truthful. One officer who classified the interviewee as truthful on the 
dichotomous veracity question found the interviewee only 50% truthful on the veracity scale 
and five officers who classified the interviewee as truthful found the interviewee only 60% 
truthful on the veracity scale.  
Police Detectives’ Questions 
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 The detectives asked on average M = 85.93 questions (SD = 32.60) during an 
interview. A paired-sampled t-test revealed that the number of questions asked before (M = 
98.71, SD = 36.00, 95% CI [82.55, 114.87]) and after the training (M = 78.11, SD = 56.97, 
95% CI [50.51, 89.40]) revealed a marginally significant effect, t(26) = 1.79, p = .084, d = 
.44, with a tendency to ask fewer questions after than before the training. In terms of the 
appropriateness of the questions, a significantly higher proportion of questions was 
considered appropriate (according to the investigative interviewing guidelines) post-training 
(M = .40, SD = .09, 95% CI [0.35, 0.45]) than pre-training (M = .36, SD = .08, 95% CI [0.33, 
0.39]), t(26) = 2.435, p = .022, d = .47, which supports Hypothesis 2. Both the pre-training 
t(26) = 4.27, p < .001, and post training t(26) = 4.66, p < .001 percentages were significantly 
higher than the 29% obtained by Oxburgh et al. (2012). Of the three types of appropriate 
questions (open-ended questions, probing questions and encourager/acknowledgements) only 
open-ended questions yielded a significant difference between pre- and post training, t(26) = 
3.25, p = .003, d = .43 (for the other two categories, both t’s < 1.16, p’s > .25). In pre-
training, fewer open-ended questions (M = .067, SD = .039, 95% CI [0.052, 0.083]) were 
asked than in post-training (M = .089, SD = .06, 95% CI [0.065, 0.113]). 
We coded the transcripts for the presence of four of the taught techniques (model 
statement, reverse order, drawings and spatial questions). A significantly higher proportion of 
questions based on these four taught techniques were asked post-training (M = .071, SD = 
.09, 95% CI [0.036, 0.108]) than pre-training (M = .002, SD = .01, 95% CI [-0.002, 0.005]), 
t(26) = 4.54, p = < .001, d = 1.38. In fact, only one detective in the pre-training interview 
asked one or more questions based on a taught technique in the pre-training interview, 
whereas 18 detectives asked one or more questions based on a taught technique in the post-
training interviews. These 18 detectives elicited significantly more details with questions 
based on the taught techniques (M = 10.92 details per question, SD = 12.26, 95% CI [4.82, 
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17.02]) than with their other questions (M = 1.64, SD = .92, 95% CI [1.18, 2.09]), t(17) = 
3.22, p = .005, d = 1.41. Finally, we correlated the proportion of questions based on the 
taught techniques with (total) accuracy in discriminating between truth tellers and liars (post-
training interviews only). The correlation was significant, r(27) = .44, p = .021, indicating 
that the more frequently police detectives asked questions based on the taught techniques, the 
more accurate they became in distinguishing between truth tellers and liars. This supports 
Hypothesis 3.  
We had also asked the police detectives whether they thought they had used each of 
the taught techniques in their post-training interviews. The police detectives indicated that, in 
the post-training interviews, they had used a variety of the techniques taught in the training, 
with asking interviewees to draw being the most frequently mentioned of the techniques (see 
Table 1). Returning to the four techniques we coded for in the transcripts (model statement, 
reverse order, drawings and spatial questions), 26 of 27 detectives thought themselves to have 
used at least one of these four taught techniques in their post-training interviews. Our 
objective coding revealed that of these four techniques the detectives actually used on 
average M = .96 (SD = .19, 95% CI [0.89, 1.03]) techniques, whereas the detectives 
subjectively reported that they had used significantly more of these techniques (M = 2.59, SD 
= 1.01, 95% CI [2.19, 2.99]), t(26) = 9.14, p < .001, d = 2.72.  
Detail elicited in the interviews 
A 2 (Training) X 2 (Veracity) X 2 (Scenario) ANOVA with detail as dependent 
variable resulted in a main effect for Scenario, F(1, 46) = 15.46, p = .000, d =1.33, with all 
other effects being not significant (all F’s < 1.19, all p’s > .28). The restaurant scenario 
elicited more detail (M = 171.88, SD = 78.51, 95% CI [149.43, 194.33]) than the secret 
meeting scenario (M = 103.82, SD = 23.95, 95% CI [85.42, 130.32]). The absence of a 
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significant Veracity main effect and a significant Training X Veracity interaction effect 
means that Hypothesis 1 is rejected.  
The fact that we found no difference between truth tellers and liars in providing detail 
contradicts the general trend in deception research that truth tellers provide more details than 
liars. We examined the possibility that the police detectives asked many questions that were 
irrelevant for lie detection purposes. For example, in the restaurant scenario a key difference 
between truth tellers and liars was that truth tellers stayed for about 15 minutes in the 
restaurant, whereas liars did not. Detectives asked many questions about what happened 
before they entered the restaurant (54% of the questions were about this topic) but they are 
irrelevant for lie detection purposes because liars’ and truth tellers’ activities did not differ 
from each other before they entered the restaurant. Only 11% of the questions were related to 
what happened within the restaurant, but, again, questions were asked that are not suitable for 
lie detection purposes. For example, several detectives asked participants to describe the 
layout of the restaurant, but since liars also had been to the restaurant, they were also able to 
do this. 
Discussion 
Accuracy 
 Police detectives were more accurate in distinguishing between truth tellers and liars 
after training (74%) than before training (59%). The pre-training accuracy did not differ from 
the accuracy rates typically obtained by professionals in lie detection studies (56%), whereas 
the post-training accuracy rate did. The Likert-scale judgements provided further evidence for 
improved ability in discriminating truth tellers from liars as a result of training. When 
distinguishing between truth and lie accuracy, it was found that the gain in total accuracy was 
entirely caused by increased lie accuracy (from 15% to 50%). The truth accuracy was perfect 
(100%) both before and after training. Of course, the 50% lie accuracy rate obtained after 
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training is still low and, in that respect, there is room for improvement. A possible 
explanation for the low lie accuracy rate is that liars in the two mock-crime scenarios did not 
just lie, but instead told a mixture of truths and lies. This reflects real life (Leins, Fisher, & 
Ross, 2013; Vrij, 2008) but makes lie detection more difficult than in scenarios where liars’ 
stories are entirely fabricated, as typically happens in deception research (Vrij, 2008).  
The increased lie detection accuracy as a result of training cannot be attributed to a 
reduced tendency to be truth-biased. A reduction in truth bias would necessarily mean that 
liars as well as truth tellers would be more frequently seen as liars. The latter did not occur. 
The perfect accuracy rates in detecting truths both pre- and post-training are remarkable and 
we have never seen this reported in the literature before. US literature suggests that American 
police officers are lie-biased (Meissner & Kassin, 2004), but research carried out in the UK 
suggested no bias amongst UK officers (Mann & Vrij, 2006; Mann, Vrij, & Bull, 2004, 2006; 
Mann, Vrij, Fisher, & Robinson, 2008). Our Likert scale findings suggest that the police 
detectives in our sample were lenient towards interviewees and made truth judgements even 
when they thought that the participant had not been entirely truthful. We do not know 
whether this leniency reflects daily practice but we would welcome it if it does. Once police 
detectives think that someone is lying to them, they tend to use more grilling interview styles 
(Kassin, Goldstein, & Savitsky, 2003) and may become less open-minded (Williamson, 
1993). Research has demonstrated that the absence of grilling interview styles results in more 
accurate information (Fallon, 2015; Meissner, Redlich, Bhatt, & Brandon, 2012). 
Police Questioning 
 In the pre-training interviews 36% of the questions asked by the police detectives 
could be considered appropriate (according to the investigative interviewing literature) and 
that percentage rose significantly to 40% in the post-training interviews. The increase in 
appropriate questioning was entirely due to an increase in open-ended questions, which was 
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expected as open-ended questions were used in the training. The training effect showed that 
discussing open-ended questioning in a training session has a positive effect, at least short 
term. These percentages of appropriate questions were significantly above the percentage 
(29%) obtained by Oxburgh et al. (2012) in their analysis of real-life interviews by English 
(and Welsh) police detectives. This means that our sample did relatively well. Yet, only a 
minority of questions were considered appropriate, which is a common finding in the 
investigative interviewing literature. To explain the relatively infrequent use of appropriate 
questions in investigative interviewing, Griffiths and Milne (2006) note that police training 
for investigative interviewing is relatively new, and that it takes time for new research 
findings to be recognised and incorporated into police training. Oxburgh and Dando (2011) 
give the following five explanations: (i) Police training manuals differ in their definitions of 
open-ended and closed questions which could cause confusion; (ii) an interviewer is inclined 
to maintain control over the interview; (iii) if in a specific interview an interviewer mainly 
seeks confirmation of known facts, specific questions is all that is required; (iv) interviewers 
may seek power over the interviewee: and (v) asking open-ended questions is an unfamiliar 
way of questioning. 
 We coded in the interview transcripts whether the police detectives had used each of 
four techniques we taught them to use: (1) model statement, (ii) reverse order, (iii) drawing, 
and (iv) spatial questions. We found two benefits of using our techniques. First, questions 
based on these techniques elicited more detail per question (10.92 details per question) than 
the other questions (1.64 detail per question), which is an important finding as eliciting detail 
is at the core of investigative interviewing (Bull, 2010; Fisher, 2010). Second, the more 
questions based on these four techniques were used in the interviews, the more accurate the 
police detectives became in correctly discriminating between truth tellers and liars. In other 
words, using the taught techniques enhanced (i) elicitation of information and (ii) 
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discrimination between truth tellers and liars. Even in the post-training interviews the number 
of questions related to the taught techniques was limited (7%), but we believe that this 
percentage looks worse than it actually is. Many questions related to the taught techniques are 
open-ended questions that invite free recall of the entire event (e.g., Please tell me in as much 
detail as possible what you saw in the video and start by describing what you saw at the end 
of the video”) and there are only a limited number of such questions that can be asked in a 
single interview.  
Detail 
This is the first deception experiment in which police detectives interviewed mock-
suspects and in which it was examined how many details they elicited from truth tellers and 
liars. The findings go against the general trend in deception research in which it is typically 
found that truth tellers provide more detail than liars (Vrij, 2005, 2008; DePaulo et al., 2003; 
Masip, Sporer, Garrido, & Herrero, 2005). This was also the case in two recent studies where 
we used the secret meeting scenario (Shaw, Vrij, Leal, & Mann, 2014; Ewens et al., 2014). 
(We have never carried out a restaurant study in the format employed in this experiment.)  
We believe that the questions asked by the police detectives are responsible for the 
absence of difference in detail between truth tellers and liars. In this experiment, reflecting 
real life, mock-suspects did not have to lie to each question and, for example in the restaurant 
scenario, could have answered questions truthfully about the person who brought them to the 
restaurant and the layout of the restaurant. Analyses of the content of the questions showed 
that the police detectives asked many questions about the confederate and about his 
interactions with the mock suspects. Even when we focussed on the part of the scenario in 
which truth tellers and liars should and did differ (what happened inside the restaurant), 
differences in detail between truth tellers and liars did not emerge, perhaps again due to 
asking the wrong questions. For example, some detectives asked participants to describe in 
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detail the layout of the restaurant, but since liars also had been in the restaurant, they were 
also able to do this, negating possible differences between truth tellers and liars. 
A possible explanation for asking –for lie detection purposes- the wrong questions is 
the lack of training in the UK in lie detection. Reading police interview manuals suggest that 
in the US lie detection plays an important role in training (Inbau, Reid, Buckley, & Jayne, 
2013) –albeit of poor quality according to experimental research by Kassin and Fong (1999) 
and Mann, Vrij, and Bull (2004) - but, as our trainees told us, lie detection training does not 
take place in the UK. The trainees reported that they have been taught that cues to deceit are 
generally unreliable (a statement backed up by research) and that they are instructed to focus 
on eliciting information instead. 
Difficulties in Training  
The police training literature contains warnings about the difficulties of training 
investigative interview techniques and to make sure that trainees subsequently introduce them 
into their work practice (Powell et al, 2005). We experienced such difficulties. As our 
findings indicated, although the police detectives thought that they had implemented our 
techniques in the way we taught them, this often did not appear to be the case. This is a 
common finding in police research where, for example, a correlation of r = .04 (p = .76) has 
been found between police officers’ proportion of asking open-ended questions and their self 
rating of their performance (Wright, Powell, & Ridge, 2007). Poor meta-cognition about 
someone’s own performance or about what someone has learned hampers possible positive 
effects of training.  
Powell et al. (2005) reviewed the effects of investigative interviewing training and 
concluded that in the most successful training studies the training was typically distributed 
over several day-long sessions separated by a break of several weeks and extending over an 
expansive period (e.g., 12 months). Another indicator of success was that participants 
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received expert feedback and instruction as a group as well as in individual sessions. 
Although we gave the trainees instructions on how to incorporate our methods into their 
investigative interviews, we did not practice this in the training, so no expert feedback was 
given or individual sessions held. A final indicator of success is giving examples of good 
practice. Although in the training we showed videotapes of our interviews, the focus was 
more on listening to the answers the examinees gave to decipher deceit than on the exact 
formulation of the questions that elicited these answers. Another challenge is to ensure that 
trainees will not fall back to their common practice over time, a problem that can only be 
overcome by having refreshment training courses periodically (Powell et al., 2005).  
Methodological Consideration 
 Due to the limited number of police detectives available to us (it is not easy to recruit 
police detectives to take part in a full-day event, given their busy schedules and other work 
commitments), we employed a within-subjects design and requested police detectives to 
interview mock suspects both pre-training and post-training. We do not think that this is 
problematic. A possible disadvantage is a rehearsal effect in interviewing suspects. That 
argument would have made sense for novice interviewers or layperson interviewers, but not 
for experienced police detectives who frequently carry out suspect interviews. In addition, we 
deliberately introduced two scenarios so that the detectives were investigating entirely 
different mock-crimes in the pre- and post training interviews. (This meant that the data could 
not be analysed with a full-within subjects design, but we felt that this was a compromise 
worth making.) Finally, we only gave the police detectives feedback about their veracity 
judgements in the mock-interviews after the post-training interview. The absence of feedback 
after the pre-training interview makes it unlikely that they learned anything from these initial 
interviews. 
Practical Application 
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 The study showed that a one-day cognitive lie detection training session yields 
positive effects in terms of the ability to detect truths and lies and eliciting information. We 
believe that this training could be a useful addition to police training in countries where no 
training in lie detection is provided (such as the UK). The fact that this training is based on 
psychological theory and research makes it more beneficial than many other lie detection 
training programmes available on the market and taught to practitioners, which have no such 
sound underpinning.  
 The current study also revealed limitations, particularly that the police detectives 
often thought they had implemented our techniques when they in fact hadn’t, and their 
inability to ask questions that elicited different amounts of detail from truth tellers and liars. 
To overcome these limitations a longer training session is required which would pay more 
attention to these two points through demonstrations, exercises and face-to-face interactive 
sessions. 
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Table 1. Interviewers’ Evaluation of the Taught Techniques 
 Used 
in 
study 
(N) 
Imposing cognitive load  
Reverse order (Recall an event in reverse chronological order.) 10 
Secondary task (Carry out two tasks simultaneously: Story telling and a second independent task.) 12 
Forced turn-taking (One interviewee starts answering the question, and after a short period of time a 
second interviewee is asked to continue with the story. After a short period of time a third person (or the 
first person again) is asked to continue the story, and so on.) 
0 
Encouraging interviewees to say more  
Model statement (Let the interviewee listen to a very detailed answer to a question unrelated to the 
event under investigation.) 
12 
Supportive interviewer (An interviewer who smiles and nods his/her head.) 13 
Mimicry (The interviewer mimics the posture/seating position of the interviewee.) 9 
Drawings (Request to sketch -for example a location or an object- rather than providing a verbal recall 
of that location or object.)  
21 
Asking unexpected questions  
Spatial questions (Questions about the spatial arrangement of people and objects: ‘Where did you and 
your friend sit in the restaurant?’,  ‘Standing in the doorway looking to your left. What you could see?’)  
17 
Processes versus outcomes (Outcomes refer to the end result: ‘What are you going to do tonight?’, 
‘What is the purpose of your trip?’, whereas processes refer to reaching this end result: ‘What made you 
decide to go to this particular film tonight’?’, ‘What did you do to plan this trip?’) 
7 
Asking the same question twice in a different format (Ask someone to (i) verbally recall the 
layout of a location followed by the request to (ii) sketch the layout of that location.) 
17 
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Appendix 1. Information about the Training Workshop and Procedure. 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Pitfalls in lie detection: Difficulties  
- a cue akin to Pinocchio’s growing nose does not exist 
- liars try to fool investigators through countermeasures 
- liars embed their lies in truthful stories 
- lack of adequate feedback about the accuracy of veracity judgements made in real life 
- some people are good liars 
Pitfalls in lie detection: Errors 
- the incorrect use of heuristics 
- paying attention to the wrong cues (e.g., increase of movements whereas liars typically 
move less than truth tellers) 
- the Othello error -  interpretation of signs of nervousness in truth tellers as a sign of deceit 
- overemphasis on nonverbal cues 
- failing to take into account inter- and intra-individual differences 
 
Demonstrations, videos and exercises used in the training workshop 
 
Demonstrations 
- A demonstration showing that hard thinking leads to a decrease in movements (Pitfalls section).  
- A demonstration showing that people are typically unaware of being mimicked (Opportunities 
section). 
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Videos 
- Videos showing that Bill Clinton blinked less when he lied compared to telling the truth (Pitfalls 
section). 
- Videos showing that in specific interview situations liars tend to move less than truth tellers (Pitfalls 
section). Videos based on Vrij’s (1993, 1994, 1995) research paradigm.  
- Videos showing the effect of turn-taking on truth-telling and lying pairs (Opportunities section). 
Videos based on Vernham, Vrij, Mann, Leal, and Hillman’s (2014) research paradigm. 
- Videos showing the effect of using a model statement on the amount of information given by truth 
tellers and liars (Opportunities section). Videos based on Leal, Vrij, Warmelink and Vernham’s 
(2015) research paradigm.  
Exercises 
- A lie detection test by paying attention to nonverbal behaviour. Two trainees took part as liar and 
truth teller, the others were observers (Pitfalls section).  
- A lie detection test by using the model statement. Two trainees took part as liar and truth teller, the 
others were observers (Pitfalls section). 
- A lie detection test based on observing drawings. The drawings were taken from Vrij et al. (2010) 
and the trainees were observers.  
 
Background given to the detectives about the two scenarios 
 
Restaurant scenario. A blue computer tablet has been stolen from an office in the last 15 
minutes and your role is to examine this crime. The suspect you are going to interview has 
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either spent the last 15 minutes in a local restaurant called (name restaurant) (truth tellers); or 
went briefly to that restaurant, stole the computer tablet after leaving that restaurant, and 
pretend to have stayed in the restaurant for the last 15 minutes (liars). The participant went to 
the restaurant with a person called Gary to meet another person, Chris, who was not actually 
there. Your task is two-fold: (1) Try to obtain as much information as possible from the 
suspect about his/her stay at the restaurant, and (2) decipher whether s/he has taken the 
computer tablet from an office in this building. Remember, liars also have visited the 
restaurant, albeit briefly. We will now give you pictures of i) the interior of the restaurant 
where the suspect has been (truth tellers for about 15 minutes and liars only briefly) and ii) 
the office from where the computer tablet was taken. Truth tellers are aware that they are 
suspected of having stolen a computer tablet from this building.  
 
Secret meeting scenario. You are a member of an intelligence agency who is going to 
interview an individual who has seen video-footage of a secret meeting which is of great 
importance to the agency but which is now lost. In that meeting a possible location is 
discussed where to install a spy device. Your task is to obtain as much information as 
possible about 1) the spy device, and 2) where it will be installed. It could be that the 
interviewee has been told that s/he can trust you and, if so, the interviewee will give you 
accurate information. It could also be that the interviewee has been told that s/he cannot trust 
you and, if so, the interviewee will give you a mixture of accurate and inaccurate information. 
Although you have no information about the location and device the interviewee is unaware 
of this and believes that you have some information, but s/he has no idea what this 
information actually is. S/he has therefore been told that the best strategy is to give you a 
mixture of accurate and inaccurate information. Your task is two-fold: (1) Try to obtain as 
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much information about the meeting from the interviewee as possible and (2) decipher 
whether s/he is lying to you. Remember, liars will not lie to you all the time but will give you 
a mixture of accurate and inaccurate information. 
 
Instructions given to the interviewees in the restaurant and secret meeting scenarios 
 
Participants in the restaurant scenario were taken by a confederate to a certain restaurant 
under the ruse of meeting another person. When arriving in the restaurant the confederate told 
the participant that the other person was not there. The confederate bought a drink for the 
participant and himself and asked the participant to sit down and to wait for him to return 
(truth tellers) or went back with the participant to the experimenter room, where the 
experimenter instructed the participant to steal a computer tablet from an office (liars). After 
15 minutes the confederate collected the participant (truth teller) from the restaurant and 
brought the participant to the experimenter room.  
Truth tellers were then told a computer tablet was stolen in the building and that they 
were one of the suspects. They would be interviewed about their whereabouts in the last 15 
minutes, the time they were in the restaurant, and were asked to tell the interviewer that they 
were in the restaurant and to convince the interviewer that they were there.  
Liars were also told that they were suspected of having taken the computer tablet and 
that they would be interviewed about their whereabouts during the last 15 minutes. They 
were instructed to deny having taken the computer tablet but to tell the interviewer that they 
were in (name restaurant) during the last 15 minutes (the restaurant they briefly went to with 
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the experimenter). The reason for staying in the restaurant was that the experimenter asked 
them to stay there and to wait for him.  
 
Participants in the secret meeting scenario took on the role of a security officer and saw video 
footage of a secret meeting between three people in which a vote was taken on a suitable 
location to plant a spy device. In the video two locations were discussed and a third location 
was mentioned but not discussed because one person had to leave. Once the video had 
finished the participants were allocated to the truth telling or lying condition. Truth tellers 
were informed that the footage they had just watched had disappeared and the agency had 
launched an investigation. The agency believed they had a mole working for them and it was 
of the upmost importance that the investigators knew as much detail about the video as they 
could. Truth tellers were told to fully cooperate with the investigators, to be completely 
truthful and to answer the questions to the best of their knowledge.  
 Liars were informed that the footage they had just viewed had disappeared and that 
the agency had launched an investigation because they needed to know in as much detail as 
possible what had happened in the video. Liars were told it was now their responsibility to 
recall that information in an interview, and that the intelligence agency believes they have a 
mole working for them. This mole could be the investigators the liars are going to talk to so 
the information cannot be disclosed to them. Liars were told the investigators knew the 
device would be placed somewhere, but they do not know where. So, above all, they must not 
reveal the location that was selected to hide the spy device and their objective was to mislead 
the investigators. Liars were told, when asked to describe the location that was selected, they 
must provide some false, decoy information. They were told to use the third location, which 
was not discussed, as the location that was selected to plant the device. As no information 
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was provided in the meeting about a third location, liars needed to invent these details. In 
total, they needed to make up three bits of information: First, the location of the building 
where the device would be planted. Second, within that building specifically where the 
device would be planted, and thirdly a reason why it is a suitable location. Liars were also 
told they needed to mislead the investigators about the device. The investigators know 
something about the device but they do not have all the details, and it is not clear what they 
know. Because of this, liars needed to provide some truthful and some false information about 
the device. This will help them appear cooperative without having to tell them everything. 
How much truthful and false information they gave was up to the participants.2 
 
                                                          
1 Several techniques cannot be assessed based on transcripts (supportive interviewer and 
mimicry) and others are not suited to the scenarios we used. That is, forced turn taking can 
only be employed with pairs of interviewees and ‘process versus outcomes’ is only suitable 
when people plan their actions. A secondary task was never employed. ‘Asking the same 
question twice in a different format’ only occurred in a normal order – versus reversed order 
and normal order versus drawings format and that was already accounted for in the coding 
under those two headings. 
2 In this study truth tellers and liars were given detailed instructions. In the restaurant scenario 
truth tellers were instructed to report that they spent time in the restaurant (rather than being 
given the vaguer instruction ‘to demonstrate their innocence’) and in the secret meeting 
scenario they were instructed to be ‘completely’ truthful. We gave the explicit instruction in 
the restaurant scenario because we were afraid that not all truth tellers would understand what 
to do if they were simply asked to ‘demonstrate their innocence’ which, subsequently, would 
introduce experimental noise. In intelligence settings it is often desirable that agents from the 
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same agency are entirely truthful to each other and we wanted to reflect that situation. Of 
course, this does not imply that all truth tellers told the interviewers all they remembered. 
Research has demonstrated that cooperative witnesses often do not provide all the 
information they remember (Vrij, Fisher, & Hope, 2014).  
 Liars in the restaurant scenario were instructed to say that they had been in the 
restaurant and in the secret meeting scenario they were instructed to tell a mixture of truths 
and lies. The instruction in the restaurant scenario was given so that we could compare the 
truth tellers’ and liars’ stories, and that it would not be obvious to the detective who would be 
lying (without such an instruction, liars who denied having been to the restaurant would then 
be easily and correctly classified as liars). The liars in the secret meeting scenario were 
instructed to provide some truthful information because (i) they were instructed to appear 
cooperative and (ii) were told that the investigator had some information about the meeting 
they had witnessed. Such a situation (the interviewee’s task is to appear cooperative and the 
interviewer may have information about the topic of investigation) is common in intelligence 
interviews (Vrij & Granhag, 2014). Of course, this means that we gave liars in the secret 
meeting scenario a difficult task to complete. However, the difficulty of the truth tellers’ task 
should not be underestimated either, as they were instructed to remember and subsequently 
report back details of a meeting in which quite a lot of information was provided. 
 We instructed the police detectives after the training to implement, where possible, 
some of the techniques they had learnt during the training. We did not give them a stricter 
instruction (implement as many techniques as you can in the interview). The reason was that 
this would make the interviewing forced and artificial, something we wanted to avoid. Of 
course, this means that we do not know why the detectives did not use all the techniques: 
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Was it the case that they did not comprehend them sufficiently to implement them or did they 
think it was not appropriate or necessary to implement them? 
